Nature of a Business License Tax by Qurik, William J.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 32 Issue 3 Article 3 
Spring 3-1-1981 
Nature of a Business License Tax 
William J. Qurik 
University of South Carolina Law Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William J. Quirk, Nature of a Business License Tax, 32 S. C. L. Rev. 471 (1981). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
NATURE OF A BUSINESS LICENSE TAX
WILLIAM J. QUIRK*
I. EARLY HISTORY
South Carolina's first constitution, the Constitution of 1776,
declared that its power was derived from the people: "this Con-
gress [is] a full and free representation of the people of this col-
ony." The second constitution provided that the "legislative au-
thority be vested in a general assembly" to consist of a senate
and house of representatives.2 Government must exercise the
grant of power in the manner prescribed in the charter. The
early constitutions placed few substantive or procedural limita-
tions upon the legislature. In the absence of an express, or nec-
essarily implied, limitation upon the grant, "the power of the
legislature in the matter is plenary."3
II. THE 1865 CONSTITUTION
Until 1865, the South Carolina Constitution contained no
specific limitations on the taxing power of the legislature. In the
colonial period, land was taxed at a fixed rate per acre.4 Follow-
ing the Revolution, the legislature adopted a system of land clas-
sification based on the nature of the land and its location to
more closely approximate actual value. The legislature estab-
lished ten classes of property (many contained subclassifica-
tions) and placed a per acre value on them.' This method was
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina Law Center; A.B., 1956, Princeton
University; LL.B., 1959, University of Virginia.
1. S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. L This article is found at 1 S.C. Stat. 128, 130.
2. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. 11. This article is found at 1 S.C. Stat. 137, 138.
3. Carrison v. Kershaw County, 83 S.C. 88, 90, 64 S.E. 1018, 1019 (1909).
The supreme legislative power of the State is vested in the General Assembly;
the provisions of our State Constitution are not a grant but a limitation of
legislative power, so that the General Assembly may enact any law not ex-
pressly, or by clear implication, prohibited by the State or Federal
Constitution.
Gaud v. Walker, 214 S.C. 451, 461-62, 53 S.E.2d 316, 320 (1949).
4. A tax of "five shillings for every hundred acres" was imposed, regardless of the
actual value of the land. 2 S.C. Stat. 662, 671, No. 360, art. XXIV (1716).
5. The value ranged from $26 per acre for "tide swamps of the first quality" to $.20
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the basis of the taxing system for eighty years.
Changing economic conditions, particularly the develop-
ment of the up-country and the decline of the rice industry, re-
quired a different system. The historian David Wallace de-
scribed the change:
By up country development, the fixed classification of lands
adopted in 1784 to correct the former injustice of taxing all
lands at the same value had now come to work an injustice to
the Low Country, where values had lagged. Therefore, it was
enacted that all property should be assessed at its real value.6
The Constitutional Convention of 1865 amended the consti-
tution to require a property tax system based on actual value.
"All taxes upon property, real or personal, shall be laid upon the
actual value of the property taxed, as the same shall be ascer-
tained by an assessment made for the purpose of laying such
tax." 7 The provision established a single standard for valua-
tion-the actual value. Valuation by classes of property was pro-
hibited. The provision was incomplete, however. Any tax system
has two elements: the rate of tax and the valuation or measure
of the object of the tax. Although the provision established the
actual value standard, it did not require that an equal and uni-
form rate of tax be applied against it. Arguably, the provision
could have been interpreted to permit classification if accom-
plished by the use of different tax rates, not by valuation.
III. THE 1868 CONSTITUTION
The error was corrected in the next constitution. The ex-
isting actual value standard was continued,8 but a new provision
was added, which required a uniform and equal rate of tax.9 The
legislature also was authorized to vest local governments "with
the power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes;
such taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property
within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same."'10
per acre for certain "fine barrens." 6 S.C. Stat. 7, No. 2079, art. I (1815). See 4 S.C. Stat.
627, No. 1234, art. I (1784).
6. 3 D. WALLACE, HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA 238 (1934).
7. S.C. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 8.
8. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 36; art. 11, § 33.
9. Id. art. IX, § 6.
10. Id. art. IX, § 8.
[Vol. 32
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The 1868 Constitution made no specific mention of license
taxes. In 1872, the legislature enacted "An Act to Provide for a
General License Law."11 Although the Act was repealed in the
same year it was enacted, 2 it led to two important cases.13
The Act was administered by the county treasurers and au-
ditors but all funds collected were for the "use of the State."
The Act did not specify any object or purpose. Indeed, it did not
characterize payments made under it as a "tax," or as a fee. It
simply required the payment of money. The payments were re-
quired for the carrying on, or engaging in, or conducting of spec-
ffied occupations. The statute used a wide variety of methods to
measure the payment.
1 4
Several railroad companies attacked the statute, and in
State v. Railroad Corporations,"5 the court adopted a rule of
substance over form. The court held that, although the legisla-
ture called the Act a license law, it, in fact, imposed a property
tax. Consequently, the provision had to be tested against the
constitutional standards applicable to property taxes. The Act
was unconstitutional because a property tax had to be levied on
actual value-not length of track. "It is a tax imposed on the
road as property. It is not laid on its income, or any franchise or
privilege, but measured solely by the length of the main track
and branches."1 " The court thought that the conclusion was "so
clear and undeniable that we shall content ourselves with a mere
reference to the clauses of the Constitution" requiring that
property be taxed at actual value. The court refused to be bound
by legislative labels.
11. 15 S.C. Stat. 195, No. 155 (1872).
12. The License Act was approved on March 13, 1872. On December 20, 1872, the
Act was repealed, effective April 1, 1873. 15 S.C. Stat. 308, No. 221.
13. State v. Railroad Corps., 4 S.C. 376 (1873); State v. Hayne, 4 S.C. 403 (1873).
14. For example, the methods for some businesses include the following: banks-by
amount of capital; railroads-by lengths of tracks; hotels, livery stables-by annual
rental value; telegraph-by length of line; lawyers-flat fee; stores selling any merchan-
dise-by annual sales; and express companies-flat fee.
Every railroad company, in the county of its principal offices, was required to pay
specified amounts based on the length of its track, i.e., (1) if a company owned less than
50 miles it paid $187.50; (2) 50-75 miles-$375; (3) 75-100 miles-625; (4) 100-150
miles-$875; (5) 150-200 miles-$1,000; (6) 200-250 miles-1,125; and (7) over 250
miles-1,250. 15 S.C. Stat. 195, No. 155 (1872).
15. 4 S.C. 376 (1873).
16. Id. at 377.
1981] 473
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In State v. Hayne,17 also decided in 1873, the court was con-
fronted with the question whether the legislature could impose
any tax other than a property tax. The License Law required a
payment of ten dollars from every person engaged in the profes-
sion or calling of attorney, physician, dentist, insurance agent, or
architect. 18 Hayne, a lawyer in Charleston, continued to practice
law without making the payment. He was indicted, found guilty,
and fined twenty dollars. Hayne asserted that the act imposed a
tax, that the detailed constitutional provisions dealing with the
property tax were exhaustive, and by fair implication, that they
prohibited the imposition of any other type of tax. The court
agreed that it was in the nature of a tax, but rejected the main
argument. The court held that the constitution did not expressly
prohibit the imposition of other taxes and that such an essential
governmental power should not be limited by the implication
urged by the defendant.
The court concluded that the "right to levy taxes is con-
ferred under the grant of general legislative power."19 The par-
ticular provision dealing with property tax "assumes the exis-
tence of such power, and undertakes to prescribe the rule of its
exercise where such exercise consists in the imposition of a tax
of a particular description, namely, taxes upon property, real
and personal."20 Consequently, the legislature had the power to
impose nonproperty taxes.
The court articulated standards that established the consti-
tutional limitations on the power to impose nonproperty taxes:
there must be equity and equality in all taxation and the license
tax must act in aid of the property tax. The court held that
"[t]he first clause [Article XI, section 1], namely, 'the General
Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of
assessment and taxation,' is not, by its terms, applicable alone as
peculiar to taxes on property. 2 1 It established the "rule of
17. 4 S.C. 403 (1873).
18. 15 S.C. Stat. 195, 200, No. 155, § 10 (1872).
19. 4 S.C. at 421.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 423 (quoting S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1). The severance of the first
clause gave it independent significance from the second, a reverse of the situation in
1865-1868. There, a class was defined-the actual value of property-but there was no
requirement that an equal rate of tax be applied to it. After Hayne a uniform and equal
rate of tax was required but the class was undefined.
[Vol. 32
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equality"2 2 for all taxes: "it may be affirmed that the object and
intent of the first clause was to introduce the principle of equal-
ity and uniformity into any and all classes of taxes that might be
authorized by the Legislature ....
In Hayne, the court expressed the general theory of a just
and equal system of taxation. All "that receive protection from
the government should contribute to its support."24 Government
"not only protects the life, personal liberty and realized posses-
sions of the citizen but protects him as well in respect to his
occupation or means of obtaining support and making accumula-
tions." '25 Different kinds of taxes complemented each other:
The tax on property equalizes the burden fairly, so far as it is a
contribution on account of the property held by the individual.
If business or occupation, as distinguished from property,
ought to contribute its share, then some other mode of taxation
than those enumerated must be resorted to.20
There are two classes of business. In one class, profits bear some
relation to the capital employed. The property tax may, to a cer-
tain extent, reach these businesses although the result is imper-
fect. In the second class of business, capital is not a material
factor in the production of income and
[a] property tax cannot, however, reach those occupations, so
as to act as a tax on occupation, where no necessary relation
exists between the amount of profits realized and the amount
of capital employed. A single instance may be taken from the
commercial classes that illustrates the whole question. A
merchant usually requires capital invested in merchandise as
the basis of his business operations; a broker, on the other
hand, does not, beyond an inconsiderable amount, to enable
him to conduct his business. The one pays taxes on his mer-
chandise, considered as capital, the other pays nothing, so far
as it regards the means employed for carrying on the business.
The protection afforded by government is as important to the
broker or to the professional man as to the merchant; yet,
22. 4 S.C. at 421.
23. Id. at 424. The provisions of article IX, § 8 remained in the 1895 Constitution in
article X, § 1. They have been deleted by the 1977 amendments.
24. Id. at 426.
25. Id.
26. Id.
1981]
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under a tax laid on property, exclusively, he escapes contribu-
tion so far as the profits of his business are concerned.27
The court held that it was unreasonable "to exempt, by the Con-
stitution, certain persons pursuing particular avocations from
the necessity of contributing to the support of the government
.... 828 and concluded: "We find, therefore, no ground in the
Constitution for excluding the Legislature from resorting to a
tax on occupations in aid of taxes imposed on property.'2 9 The
emphasized language is subject to the interpretation that a li-
cense tax not in aid of the property tax would be invalid. In
sum, the idea that a license tax should act in aid of the property
tax is intrinsic to the nature of a license tax.
In 1874, another license tax case, State v. City of Colum-
bia,30 reached the court. The legislature in 1871 had specifically
authorized the City of Columbia to impose a "reasonable charge
or tax" on all persons and corporations engaged in business.31
The city ordinance varied the fee according to the occupation.
3 2
Several banks challenged this ordinance and argued that the
charge imposed upon them could not be considered a tax; it was
a license fee, which was illegal. It was illegal because banking
was a lawful occupation, and a license fee "necessarily implies a
right to control the business . . ., either by prohibiting its exer-
cise or permitting such exercise only upon conditions imposed
according to the discretion of the city authorities."33
The court agreed that this was historically correct:
Strictly speaking, a license of a trade or calling by a mu-
nicipal corporation is referable to the police power possessed
by such bodies, and implies authority to prohibit the exercise
of such business, except upon conditions having reference to
some end of police regulation. In its simplest form of exercise,
27. Id, at 427.
28. Id.
29. Id, at 428 (emphasis added).
30. 6 S.C. 1 (1874).
31. 14 S.C. Stat. 572, No. 343, § 8 (1871).
32. The ordinance required an annual fee of $100 for astrologers; $25 for lawyers;
$200 for banks and bankers; and for billiard halls, $50 for the first table and $25 for each
additional table. Retail stores were classified by the amount of annual sales. Approxi-
mately eighty additional occupations were specified and a fee was fixed for each class.
Columbia, S.C., Ordinance to Regulate Licenses for the Year 1873 (Dec. 23, 1872).
33. 6 S.C. at 5.
[Vol. 32
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as where employed solely for the purpose of regulating avoca-
tions of a class tending to disturb public order, health or mo-
rality, it is a power totally distinct from that of imposing taxes
for the purpose of raising revenue.4
In this situation (e.g., licensing taxis or pawnbrokers), the licens-
ing was intended to regulate the conduct of the undertaking and
the fee had to be related to the cost of enforcement. But in its
next stage, the license tax, as the court noted, had
been long employed for the purpose of imposing, on a class of
avocations to which the exercise of that power particularly re-
lates, embracing places of public entertainment and amuse-
ment, taxation for the purpose of revenue of an extraordinary
character, based upon the idea that avocations of that class
should contribute specially to the support of the government in
excess of the burdens borne by the productive industries.35
In the last historical stage, the court found that the license tax
was imposed on lawful occupations "where circumstances of a
peculiar nature" made "special taxes" appropriate.
In this way it became one of the customary modes of raising
revenue. The extension of this mode of raising revenue beyond
the sphere of avocations to which the power of police regula-
tion properly related, where circumstances of a peculiar nature
rendered it requisite that each particular avocation should
have its own rate of taxation, was natural where taxation had
divided itself into two methods,... [the general property tax
imposing an equal rate on actual value and another] such as
could be treated in no other way than by subdivision into dis-
tinct classes ... [with separate rates] .... [T]he license, as a
form of collecting special taxes, has been frequently extended
to embrace all subjects of taxation calling for special rates of
taxation. 6
In City of Columbia, the court continued to apply substance
over form-"always looking rather to substance than to names
in fixing the nature of an imposition by way of license. ' 37 The
court expressly considered whether the license tax "in effect
34. Id. at 6.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
1981]
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taxes property" without regard to appropriate standards and
found that it did not.38
The Hayne and City of Columbia cases established the
standards to be applied to a license tax: (1) the court will look to
the substance of the tax, not its form, to determine whether it is
a license tax; (2) a license tax must be equitable; (3) a license tax
is in aid of the general property tax; and (4) a license tax is a
special tax and classification must be rationally based on ser-
vices provided by the government. A high tax must be based
upon special or disproportionate services rendered.39
IV. THE 1895 CONSTITUTION
There were two specific references to license taxes in the
Constitution of 1895. One was in a proviso clause to the basic
taxation section, which required a "uniform and equal rate" of
taxation.40 The proviso clause created an exception: "the Gen-
eral Assembly may provide for a graduated tax on incomes, and
for a graduated license on occupations and business. 4 1 Al-
though, the United States Supreme Court found the Federal In-
come Tax Act unconstitutional,42 the South Carolina Constitu-
tion of 1895 assured that such a tax would be valid in South
Carolina.
The second reference to a license tax was in the section re-
garding the delegation of taxing power to municipal
corporations:
The corporate authorities of cities and towns in this State shall
be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate
purposes, said taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and
property within the jurisdiction of the body composing the
same; and all the property, except such as is exempt by law,
within the limits of cities and towns shall be taxed for the pay-
ment of debts contracted under authority of law. License or
privilege taxes imposed shall be graduated so as to secure a
38. Id. at 9.
39. Recent South Carolina Supreme Court decisions have reaffirmed these princi-
ples, See, e.g., notes 123.29 and accompanying text infra.
40. S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. X, § 1.
41. Id.
42. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, rehearing, 158 U.S. 601
(1895).
478 [Vol. 32
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just imposition of such tax upon the classes subject thereto.43
Although these two provisions made no substantial change in ex-
isting law, the requirement of a graduated tax precluded the im-
position of a flat fee tax."
In Hill v. City Council,4 5 the court affirmed the standards to
be applied to license taxes and discussed presumptions and bur-
dens of proof. The City Council of Abbeville had enacted an or-
dinance that imposed a tax of $50 on a bank that had capital of
$75,000 and a tax of only $75 on a cotton mill with $500,000 of
capital. The taxpayer argued that, on the face of the ordinance,
it was discriminatory because it did not reach all classes. The
court rejected the argument and noted that
[a]s all callings, occupations and kinds of business differ more
or less, the one from the other, the very power to impose a tax
that will be just on each class "involves the right to make dis-
tinctions between different trades and between essentially dif-
ferent methods of conducting the same general character of
business or trade," and what is a reasonable license fee, must
depend largely upon the sound discretion of the city council.
48
The lesson of Hill is that the taxpayer has to produce un-
derlying facts to be successful. If reasonable classification is
"largely" within the discretion of the city council, the burden of
going forward appears to be on the taxpayer. The taxpayer
based his arguments on the face of the ordinance, maintaining
that "bankers are exempt, that the taxation is not just, as it does
not reach all classes . . . . 4 This showing, according to the
court, was insufficient, but what would be sufficient was not
clear.
A taxpayer succeeded two years later, however, in Standard
Oil Co. v. Spartanburg.48 A city ordinance imposed a license tax
on the business of selling oil. The tax of $250 was payable by
any merchant who sold fifty gallons or more of oil. The tax did
43. S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. VIII, § 6 (emphasis added).
44. Town of Forest Lake v. Town of Forest Acres, 227 S.C. 163, 87 S.E.2d 587
(1955).
45. 59 S.C. 396, 38 S.E. 11 (1901).
46. Id. at 427-28, 38 S.E. at 24 (quoting In re Haskell, 32 L.R.A. 527, 529 (1896))
(emphasis added).
47. Id. at 429, 38 S.E. at 24.
48. 66 S.C. 37, 44 S.E. 377 (1903).
1981]
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not apply to merchants who resold oil on which the license had
been paid. The taxpayer asserted that the tax was unconstitu-
tional and discriminatory in three respects: (1) it did not apply
to merchants selling in quantities under fifty gallons; (2) it did
not apply to merchants selling oil on which the license had been
paid; and (3) it did not apply to merchants engaged in other
lines of business. The court rejected the first and third argu-
ments.49 The exemption of merchants who sold oil on which the
tax had been paid was held void, however, because the exemp-
tion had no reasonable basis, it did not benefit the city or those
who paid the tax nor did it encourage commerce.50 The court
concluded that the exemption "was intended as a mere favor to
those included within the classification.
'5 1
A few months later, Standard Oil was distinguished in Cow-
art v. City Council.52 A Greenville ordinance divided persons en-
gaged in the business of lending money into four different-clas-
ses. Plaintiff objected to the class in which he had been placed,
those lending money upon personal property security, the most
heavily taxed class. The class had three exceptions: a regularly
established bank; time dealers making advances for agricultural
supplies; and loan, savings, or investment companies. He argued
that the classification was discriminatory.
The city presented testimony "that there ha[d] grown up in
the City of Greenville a species of money lending by the week or
month to individuals, sums of money ranging from $10 and
upwards, upon which by renewals required and enforced at the
end of each month, as much as $6 as interest on $10 is realized
each year. '53 The court noted that the city's imposition of the
prescribed classification was justified for revenue production,
and was within the exercise of the city's police power. "[T]hese
private dealers in loans on personal property may be anything
they choose. They are or may be here to-day and yonder on the
morrow. Like the Arabs, they may fold their tents and be off at
any moment. '54 Standard Oil, "set up by the plaintiff," was
49. Id. at 41, 44 S.E. at 378 (citing Hill v. City Council, 59 S.C. 396, 38 S.E. 11
(1903)).
50. Id. at 45, 44 S.E. at 380.
51. Id. at 46, 44 S.E. at 380.
52. 67 S.C. 35, 45 S.E. 122 (1903).
53. Id. at 42-43, 45 S.E. at 125.
54. Id. at 43, 45 S.E. at 125. The court discussed Hill and Simmons v. Western
480 [Vol. 32
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found "dissimilar. ' ' "s
In City of Laurens v. Anderson,56 an exemption of all Con-
federate soldiers from the payment of any license tax was de-
clared void. The exemption was unconstitutional because it was
unreasonable.5 7 A similar issue was presented in Carroll v. Town
of York.5 The town had adopted a license ordinance pursuant to
a state statute that authorized a "license. . .graduated accord-
ing to the gross income of the persons, firms or corporations re-
quired to pay such license, or upon the amount of capital in-
vested in said business." 59 The statute exempted any person
engaged in the purchase or sale of cotton and did not apply to
cities of more than 50,000 nor to Sumter, Clarendon, Orange-
burg, or Greenville. The York ordinance applied to all occupa-
tions, including the sale of cotton. Carroll, a cotton seller, pro-
tested the payment claiming that he was exempt under state
law.
The court held that the exemption was unconstitutional be-
cause the constitutional requirement that the legislature "pro-
vide by general laws for the organization and classification" 60 of
cities was not met when "4 other towns admittedly in her class
have not been restricted to collect the same tax . . -*" The
court continued: "the restriction laid upon some 40 towns was
with reference to the State's staple agricultural product. There
is no reason why four towns of the State should have the power
to levy a license tax upon the vendors of cotton while 40 other
towns were prohibited to do so.
''6
2
The circuit court had found that the constitution gave the
town "an inherent right to collect a license tax" which could not
Union Tel. Co., 63 S.C. 425,41 S.E. 521 (1902), an unrelated case in which the court held
that equal protection classification "'must always rest upon some difference which bears
a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is pro-
posed;'... [or be] 'based upon some reasonable ground-some difference which bears a
just and proper relation to the attempted classification. . .' " 63 S.C. at 431, 41 S.E. at
522-23 (quoting Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155, 165 (1897)).
55. 67 S.C. at 45, 45 S.E. at 126.
56. 75 S.C. 62, 55 S.E. 136 (1906).
57. 75 S.C. at 64, 55 S.E. at 136. The court quoted the language of Gulf, Colo. & S.F.
Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155, 165 (1897).
58. 109 S.C. 1, 95 S.E. 121 (1918).
59. Id. at 2, 95 S.E. at 122.
60. S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. VIII, § 1.
61. 109 S.C. at 7, 95 S.E. at 123.
62. Id.
1981] 481
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be limited by the legislature.6 3 The supreme court, in dictum,
disagreed. Although the court recognized that the 1895 Constitu-
tion, for the first time, made two specific references to license
taxes, it concluded that "the new Constitution has not modified
the general rule of law that the legislative branch of the govern-
ment has the exclusive power of taxation, but may delegate it to
towns for municipal purposes and may, therefore, restrict the
towns in that respect."'" The constitutional provisions were not
self-executing.
In Ex parte Bates,65 a license tax was invalidated because it
was unreasonably high. The Sumter license ordinance imposed a
tax of $300 per day on the business of auctioning horses and
mules, and, if annual gross income exceeded $2,000, an addi-
tional 2 % of the excess was charged. Bates, a member of a
firm of livestock dealers doing business in Sumter, was arrested
when he attempted to conduct a horse and mule auction without
paying the license tax. The case was before the supreme court on
a motion of habeas corpus. The court found:
It would seem a reasonably low estimate that auction sales
would be held by one who established such a business, at least
once a month for three months in the year; and if he should
sell $10,000 worth at each sale, his gross income would be
$30,000. If he should be charged for only three days in the
year, the license tax would be $300 plus 2 / percent of $8,000,
$200, $500 for each day, $1,500 for the three days, a tax of 5
percent on his gross income.66
Such a tax was unreasonable in amount. The court concluded
that "[t]he ordinance clearly violates the limitations contained
in the statute, in that it fixes an unreasonable sum for the li-
cense, does not graduate the license fairly according to gross in-
come or according to capital invested, and is void."
'87
Ex parte Bates is important because it established that a
license tax must be reasonable in amount and recognized that a
license tax is simply an authorization to engage in a business,
not a substitute for property and income taxes. It is a special
63. Id. at 5, 95 S.E. at 122.
64. Id. at 10, 95 S.E. at 124.
65. 127 S.C. 167, 120 S.E. 717 (1923).
66. Id. at 172, 120 S.E. at 718 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 173, 120 S.E. at 719.
[Vol. 32
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tax, not a major or general source of revenue; it is has a different
theoretical justification. The services provided by the city have
no relation to gross income. An insurance company with gross
income of $5 million would not require more services than a sim-
ilar company with gross income of $1 million. The same reason-
ing supports a dollar maximum amount on the tax that any one
licensee is required to pay.a
A state license tax was held unconstitutional in the 1930 de-
cision, Martin v. Chief Game Warden.9 The Hide Buyer's Act
required a statewide license tax of $200 for nonresidents. A resi-
dent in the same business was required to pay $25 per county,
and if he did business in more than eight counties, he would pay
a higher tax than a nonresident. The court found that this was
an "unconstitutional discrimination against a resident buyer.1
7 0
In addition, the tax was void because it was not graduated.
Two years later, in Pee Dee Chair Co. v. City of Camden,1
the court identified the applicable rule of construction for li-
cense tax laws:
A statute or an ordinance requiring a business license or im-
posing a license or occupation tax must be construed liberally
in favor of the citizen and strictly against the government, and
no one can be held to payment of the tax unless he comes
clearly within the terms of the particular statute or
ordinance.7 1
The issue in the case was whether a Darlington manufacturing
company was doing business in Camden when it delivered one
lot of furniture to a retail dealer in Camden. Camden asserted
that the company was engaged in the business of "trucks hauling
merchandise." The court noted that although a single act, under
certain circumstances, would constitute "doing business," the
manufacturing company's act was simply an isolated, incidental,
or casual delivery. 3 The furniture company could not be taxed
68. For many years the South Carolina Legislature placed such a cap on municipal
license taxes-$2,500 for cities with a population of more than 40,000. 1904 S.C. Acts
396, No. 213.
69. 160 S.C. 370, 158 S.E. 731 (1930).
70. Id. at 373, 158 S.E. at 732-33.
71. 165 S.C. 86, 162 S.E. 771 (1932).
72. Id. at 89, 162 S.E. at 772.
73. Id. at 93, 162 S.E. at 774.
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by Camden.
Spartanburg was permitted to classify chain stores differ-
ently than individual stores in Great A & P Tea Co. v. City of
Spartanburg.74 Retail merchants were divided into six classes,
according to the number of stores owned. Very different rates
were charged. For example, a single store owner paid $7.50 for
the first $5,000 of gross income and $1.50 for each additional
$1,000; an owner of six stores paid $100 for the first $5,000 of
gross income and $5.00 for each additional $1,000.
The court found a valid basis for the classification:
The six-store merchant likely puts a six times greater
strain upon the fire and police departments than does the one-
store merchant, and uses the streets for perhaps more than six
times as many stocking and delivery operations. The chain
store, in reality conducting a combination wholesale and retail
business from its regional warehouses through its local outlets,
daily uses the streets with its large trucks and trailers, making
them serve as freight highways, accentuating traffic problems,
and subjecting the streets to extraordinary wear and tear. The
public provides the streets, the police and fire protection. The
public provides the community; the chain store selects from a
consideration of the public facilities and protections.
75
These considerations, the court concluded, made "a clear dis-
tinction between the classes in the manner and method of doing
business, in the hazard to public welfare and in the tax on the
public facilities. '7 6 In Great A & P Tea Co., the court focused on
the large trucks that subjected the streets to extraordinary wear
and tear. This is the first case to expressly relate a license tax
and its reasonableness to the services provided by the city, ex-
pressed as "the hazard to public welfare" and "the tax on the
public facilities.
'77
Pee Dee Chair was distinguished in Crosswell & Co. v.
Town of Bishopville.7 1 A license tax had been imposed on a
Sumter grocer who made deliveries in Bishopville once or twice
a week. This was held to be a continuity of business, unlike the
74. 170 S.C. 262, 170 S.E. 273 (1933).
75. Id. at 271, 170 S.E. at 276.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 172 S.C. 26, 172 S.E. 698 (1934).
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single isolated act in Pee Dee Chair. Although the Bishopville
tax did not apply to resident grocers, the court concluded that
"the merchant residing in another town may be placed in a dif-
ferent class from the local merchant.
' '79
The Sumter license tax ordinance was again before the
court in American Bakeries Co. v. City of Sumter.80 Generally,
bakeries were charged a $25 tax but those with an established
place of business beyond the Sumter town limits that sold or
delivered products to Sumter by trucks or otherwise were
charged a tax of $50. The circuit judge found that because the
tax was not graduated, it was void. The supreme court, however,
held that the record was not adequate to show a lack of gradua-
tion and upheld the tax.
Courts have been quite liberal in according to municipali-
ties the right to classify the subjects to license taxes, and such
classifications are generally upheld where the subjects are in
different conditions; where the selection is not capricious and
arbitrary; where there exists a reasonable ground for difference
or policy.81
As in Crosswell & Co., the court found that nonresidence alone
justified a distinction because there was no indication of any dif-
ference in the manner in which the business was conducted. Per-
haps the inarticulated point in Crosswell & Co. and American
Bakeries is that a higher license tax on nonresidents will com-
pensate-to some extent-the property tax paid by residents.
Southern Fruit Co. v. Porters2 raised the question whether
the use of the streets justified a high license tax. Plaintiffs were
nonresident corporations with principal places of business in
North Carolina and Georgia. They had no warehouse in South
Carolina. Plaintiffs' salesmen solicited orders from retail
merchants in various South Carolina cities and towns. Upon re-
ceipt of the orders at the principal place of business, the goods
were loaded on company trucks and delivered to the customers.
A number of towns and cities had passed ordinances vari-
ously designated as a tax "for the use and occupation of streets,"
79. Id. at 30, 172 S.E. at 700.
80. 173 S.C. 94, 174 S.E. 919 (1934).
81. Id. at 97, 174 S.E. at 920.
82. 188 S.C. 422, 199 S.E. 537 (1938).
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a "delivery license tax," a "privilege tax," an "occupational tax,"
and a tax "for the use of streets."8 These statutes were special,
that is, they were not part of a general license tax ordinance.
The municipalities relied on a section of the South Carolina
Code of 1932,84 which authorized "ordinances respecting the
roads [and] streets" for the health, welfare, and order of the
city. The court held that
any and all ordiances [sic] enacted under this section must be
in the exercise of the police power .... [A]n Act or ordinance
imposing a license tax under the police power as a means of
regulation is valid, only when it is within the limits of such
power and is intended for regulation; otherwise it is invalid, as
where the license tax is imposed for revenue purposes, in the
guise of a police regulation.85
Municipalities could regulate speed, parking, and traffic gener-
ally. The ordinances in question did not purport to regulate or
restrict the use of trucks; they were intended to produce reve-
nue. The ordinances were struck down because they were not
authorized by the police power.
The cities made no argument that the statutes were author-
ized by state laws permitting municipalities to impose license
taxes on the privilege of engaging in business. These taxes could
be imposed to produce revenue. Presumably this argument was
not made because the tax was for the privilege of using the
streets, not the privilege of engaging in business.
The court stated that the legislature could authorize a mu-
nicipality to impose a reasonable tax "for the exercise of the
privilege of using the streets."86 The legislature, however, had
not yet done so and "[s]uch specific taxing power not having
been conferred, any ordinance exacting a license for the use of
the streets is invalid.
'87
The right to travel on and along the streets of a city be-
longs to the general public. An ordinance cannot legally be
made which contravenes a common right, unless the power to
do so be plainly conferred by a valid and competent legislative
83. Id. at 426, 199 S.E. at 539.
84. 1898 S.C. Acts 820, No. 522.
85. 188 S.C. at 428, 199 S.E. at 539.
86. Id. at 430, 199 S.E. at 540.
87. Id.
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grant.... Municipalities may, of course, regulate the speed of
vehicles moving along its streets, provide for proper parking,
and otherwise regulate traffic conditions. The use of the public
streets of a city by the public is not a privilege, but a right, and
a tax for such use can be exacted only under the authority of
legislative sanction. And the authority to impose a tax or to
exact a license must clearly appear, and must be strictly con-
strued. If there is a doubt as to the right to tax, it must be
resolved adversely to this right. In this case there is no express
power given to cities and towns of this State to impose this tax
or license fee, and no implied power arises which gives the
right. Cities and towns of this State cannot exercise the power
of taxation for the use and occupation of streets by the travel-
ing public, under the guise of a license or otherwise, unless
such power is unequivocally conferred upon them by the legis-
lature. When such power is clearly conferred Courts have gen-
erally upheld the proper exercise thereof.88
The court also discussed the burden of the tax on interstate
commerce. Although a tax, or a reasonable toll, might be im-
posed on interstate commerce as compensation for the use of the
highway or a bridge, it could not be a general revenue tax. The
latter would be a burden on interstate commerce and, thus,
would be prohibited.
In 1946, the court decided another tax jurisdiction case,
Triplett v. City of Chester.89 A general building and highway
construction contractor conducted his administrative and execu-
tive work at his central office in Chester and stored equipment
in the city. The contractor maintained that no part of his busi-
ness (by which he meant actual construction work) was done in
Chester.
The city was authorized to impose a license tax on persons
engaged in business "in whole or in part, within the limits" of
the city.90 The court concluded that the contractor was subject
to the tax:
We find no reasonable justification for a construction of this
ordinance which would make the liability for the payment of a
license contingent upon all of the functions of the taxpayer's
88. Id. at 429-30, 199 S.E. at 540 (citation omitted).
89. 209 S.C. 455, 40 S.E.2d 684 (1946).
90. 1939 S.C. Acts 137, No. 96 (repealed 1975).
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business being performed within the City of Chester. It was not
contemplated that the various phases of a business should be
segregated and only that part taxed which was actually carried
or within the corporate limits.9 1
The next case of interest is the 1955 decision, Town of For-
est Lake v. Town of Forest Acres.92 Forest Acres had imposed a
license tax on every merchant or other person doing business at
retail. The charge was a minimum fee of $5 with an additional
$.50 imposed on each $1,000 of sales in excess of the minimum
(i.e., above $10,000). Some businesses, however, were charged
fiat fees that were not related to gross income.9 3
The court held that the flat fee provisions were unconstitu-
tional because a "license must be graduated as to the affected
classification in compliance with the provisions of the Constitu-
tion and Statute ... "' The court held that the general provi-
sions of the ordinance were severable and valid. Without discus-
sion, the court upheld the imposition of the minimum fee, which
also appeared vulnerable to attack because of a lack of gradua-
tion. After Town of Forest Acres, the use of minimum fees with
an additional tax graduated by gross income became common.
V. THE INSURANCE COMPANY CASES-1962-1979
Since 1962, insurance companies have brought a number of
cases concerning license taxes to the South Carolina Supreme
Court. The results have been generally unfavorable for the
taxpayers.
A license law, which imposed a tax of 2% of the gross pre-
miums of fire and casualty companies was contested in City of
Columbia v. Putnam.9 5 The 2% tax included premiums collected
through offices or agents located in the city or collected on poli-
cies written on property located in the city. The ordinance did
not set a maximum amount. Based on gross premiums, the
Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company owed the
city $25,000. The company refused to pay, and its manager, Put-
91. 209 S.C. at 462, 40 S.E.2d at 687. See also 1975 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 251.
92. 227 S.C. 163, 87 S.E.2d 587 (1955).
93. For example, barbers paid $20 for each chair; building and loan associations
paid $50; real estate agents paid $25. Id. at 165, 87 S.E.2d at 588.
94. Id. at 167, 87 S.E.2d at 589.
95. 241 S.C. 195, 127 S.E.2d 631 (1962).
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nam, was convicted for failure to pay the tax. Putnam argued
that, on its face, the ordinance was void since it did not conform
to the enabling act-it set no maximum on the tax.96 The court,
in effect, judicially amended the ordinance to read in the limita-
tion and held the ordinance valid.
Putnam also argued that the ordinance was, as a matter of
law, discriminatory, arbitrary, and unreasonable. Fire and casu-
alty companies were treated differently from life, health, and
hospital companies, a clear discrimination. The court rejected
the argument.
The power of a municipality to fix different rates for li-
censes where the classes are different has been upheld by this
Court many time&....
... The fact that one class may pay more proportionately
than other classes does not of itself make the license fee unrea-
sonable or arbitrary since this is largely within the discretion of
City Council.97
The court also stated that the state legislature had treated fire
companies as a separate class by providing that no license fee for
a fire insurance company could be charged "in any other manner
than on a percentage of the premiums. 9 8 The statute provided
as follows: "such license fee not to exceed two percent of the
premiums collected in such municipality except in cities of fifty
thousand inhabitants or more where not exceeding five percent
may be charged."9' 9 The fact of separate treatment by the legis-
lature is "persuasive" that separate treatment by a municipality
"is not discriminatory or unreasonable." 100
In City of Columbia v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co.,101 the
96. The enabling act provided that no license tax could exceed $1,000 except that
the maximum could be raised to $2,500 by a two-thirds vote of the city council. 1904 S.C.
Acts 396, No. 213 (repealed 1975).
97. 241 S.C. at 198-99, 127 S.E.2d at 633.
98. Id. at 199, 127 S.E.2d at 633.
99. As enacted in 1947, this provision specified premiums "collected in such munici-
pality." 1947 S.C. Acts 322, No. 232. In 1961, it was amended to include premiums "real-
ized from risks located" within the municipality regardless of where the premiums were
collected. To avoid double taxation, the amendment provided a preference for the mu-
nicipality where the property was located. 1961 S.C. Acts 273, No. 198 (current version at
S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-5-490 (1976)).
100. 241 S.C. at 199, 127 S.E.2d at 634.
101. 249 S.C. 388, 154 S.E.2d 674 (1967).
1981]
19
Qurik: Nature of a Business License Tax
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
computation of Niagara's 1963 license tax was at issue. The ordi-
nance had provided that the tax be based on the business trans-
acted in the preceding year. During 1962, the Eagle Fire Insur-
ance Company did substantial business in Columbia. Eagle sold
its business to Niagara, effective at 11:59 p.m. on December 31,
1962. The city claimed, and the court agreed, that the 1962 busi-
ness of Niagara and Eagle should be combined to determine Ni-
agara's tax. The court concluded that the combination was in
accord with the intent of the ordinance.
The obvious purpose of the license ordinance is to impose a
tax, or license fee, upon the privilege of doing business in the
city during the current year. Implicit in that purpose is the
requirement that the tax be fair and nondiscriminatory. In
many classes of business the license fee is calculated on gross
receipts reasonably to be expected during the license year, us-
ing the amount of such receipts during the preceding year as a
measure for computing the amount of the fee.
10 2
The South Carolina Codes of 1952 and 1962 classified mu-
nicipalities according to population for license tax purposes. 1°3
The license tax for the class of cities with populations of more
than 70,000 was specifically limited to $2,500. There was no limi-
tation imposed on the classes with smaller populations. In Glens
Falls Insurance Co. v. City of Columbia,10 4 the city of Columbia
had imposed a 2% tax on gross premiums and argued that the
$2,500 limitation applied to each agent of the company rather
than the company as a whole. The court rejected this position
and explained that the legislature intended to prevent munici-
palities in search of revenue from imposing an unreasonable and
unconscionable license tax.
In fixing a limitation in Section 47-407 on the amount of
the license tax which might be imposed thereunder, it is a rea-
sonable assumption that the Legislature had in mind prohibit-
ing the imposition of an unreasonable or unconscionable tax.
Since the assessment of the tax was graduated as to income,
102. Id. at 392, 154 S.E.2d at 676 (emphasis added).
103. The classes were towns with a population of less than 1,000, S.C. CODE § 47-173
(1952); towns and cities with a population between 1,000 and 70,000, S.C. CODE § 47-271
(1952); and cities with a population greater than 70,000, S.C. CODE § 47-407 (1952) (these
sections were repealed in 1975).
104. 242 S.C. 237, 130 S.E.2d 573 (1963).
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the payment of an unreasonable license tax in cities of smaller
population was no doubt considered unlikely. This could have
been reasonably considered a sufficient safeguard against the
imposition of an unreasonable license tax. As stated in the or-
der of the Circuit Court: "Doubtless the Legislature realizes
that a city in its search for revenue might be inclined to re-
quire the payment of an unreasonable or unconscionable li-
cense tax and hence placed the restriction contained in Section
47-407 on the larger cities because no such figure would proba-
bly ever be reached in the smaller towns." The exact line of
demarcation between the classification of cities to effect such
result was a matter within the discretion of the Legislature.103
The code section applicable to cities with populations less
than 70,000, which contained no specific limitation, was consid-
ered in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. City of New-
berry (Newberry 1).1o6 A city ordinance had imposed a 2% tax
on the gross premiums of insurance companies. The taxpayer
contended that the tax was confiscatory because the company
was losing money. The tax, consequently, had to be paid out of
capital.1 0 7 The court rejected this position:
[A]ppellant argues that the license tax is unreasonable be-
cause it is losing money as a property insurer. We doubt that
profits and losses are a proper consideration in determining
reasonable amounts to be charged for licenses. This is espe-
cially true when the taxpayer, as here, is regulated as to rates
by a governmental agency and may procure an increase in rates
upon a proper showing. The profit or loss approach would ap-
pear to present a hopeless situation because one taxpayer
within a classification might be making a profit while another
105. Id. at 245-46, 130 S.E.2d at 577-78. After City of Columbia, the legislature
amended S.C. CODE § 47-407 (1952) to apply to cities over 70,000 but under 90,000 1965
S.C. Acts 588, No. 337. In United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. City of Greenville, 250
S.C. 136, 156 S.E.2d 417 (1967), the taxpayer argued that a $2,500 limitation should be
read into S.C. CODE § 47-271 (1952), which applied to cities under 70,000 and contained
no specific limitation. The court rejected the argument and noted: "There is no conten-
tion that the taxes imposed upon plaintiffs were discriminatory or unreasonable per se."
Id. at 139, 156 S.E.2d at 418. Currently, S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-30 (1976), contains no
specific limitations. In a proper case, the contention that a high license tax is unreasona-
ble or excessive per se may have merit. As a license tax exceeds a normal range it takes
on the characteristics of a general tax-usually a property tax. If it were a property tax,
it would fail since it does not comply with the Constitution. S.C. CONST., art. X (1976).
106. 253 S.C. 197, 169 S.E.2d 599 (1969).
107. Brief of Appellant at 12.
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might be losing money. Many things bring about a loss or a
profit and neither city council nor this court should be called
upon to determine whether a loss is caused by poor business
management or payment of a license tax or some other
cause.'
This language is consistent with the nature of a license tax-a
payment for the privilege of engaging in business. It is not a tax
on the profits of a business; it is not an income tax. The measure
of a license tax has always been gross income, not net income.
A special section of the South Carolina Code dealt with fire
insurance companies and mandated that municipal license fees
be charged on a percentage of the gross premiums collected. It
further specified that such a charge could not exceed 2% in a
city with a population under 50,000 or 5% in a city with a popu-
lation of over 50,000. The trial court found that the section
"shows that the Legislature accepts or recognizes that a 2 per
cent license is not an unreasonable charge and also seems to
place insurance companies in a special category. 1P0 9
The taxpayer proferred as evidence of the gross disparity in
the rates of taxation a comparison of the tax it paid with the tax
on twenty other businesses. The comparison showed that fire
and casualty companies paid 2% of gross receipts while most
other businesses were taxed at much lower rates. The taxpayer
argued that since he had showed a gross disparity in rates, the
burden shifted to the city to justify the reasonableness of this
classification: "The respondent City controls the knowledge of
why the appellant's class of business is required to pay so much
more than other classes for a license. If there were a justifica-
tion, the respondent City should have produced evidence of
it.,,11o
The court disagreed: "One can only speculate on the ques-
tion of the reasonableness by comparison. Reasonableness must
be determined by the factual situation involved." '111 The court
continued "'In the absence of positive evidence to the contrary,
acts or ordinances licensing or taxing an occupation or privilege
108. 253 S.C. at 204, 169 S.E.2d at 603 (emphasis added).
109. Record at 15.
110. Brief of Appellant at 8.
111. 253 S.C. at 203, 169 S.E.2d at 603.
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are presumed to be reasonable ... 112 The court concluded
that "plaintiff has not met the burden of proof of showing that
the license tax is unreasonable .... ""Is
The only reference to the issue of property tax equalization
occurred in an amicus brief:
Since, by their nature, these insurance companies do not
have a need to own any appreciable amount of real or personal
property, they pay little or no property taxes to support the
City in contrast to the business whose rates they use for com-
parison in their argument.
The City is limited in its sources of revenue, but it must
provide equal services for all its inhabitants. Should these in-
surance companies not be required to make "equality of bur-
den" a reality as well as the rule by paying their fair share of
the total tax burden?
114
Neither the other briefs nor the court's opinion refer to the
property tax issue.
Property tax equalization was a major issue in subsequent
cases. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. City of New-
berry (Newberry II),1 5 the city appealed from a summary judg-
ment for the taxpayer, United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Company (USFG). The mayor of the city had been deposed by
the taxpayer and testified that USFG was the principal benefi-
ciary of the fire and police services provided by the city." 6 Be-
cause USFG paid no property taxes the license tax was intended
to equalize the costs. Although these arguments would subse-
quently be accepted, in Newbery II, they were made with little
force and were surrounded with other weak and confused testi-
mony. On appeal, the city claimed that a genuine issue of fact
112. Id. at 204, 169 S.E.2d at 603 (quoting 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 16, at 511 (1948))
(emphasis added).
113. 253 S.C. at 204, 169 S.E.2d at 603.
114. Amicus Brief of the City of Columbia, S.C. at 6. The source of the quote "eq-
uity of burden" is not known.
115. 257 S.C. 433, 186 S.E.2d 239 (1972).
116. The mayor stated:
That the maximum that could be charged was two percent and my feeling
and the Council's feeling was that so many of these companies paid no ad
valorem tax whatever to the City of Newberry, they do business here, yet our
Fire Department and Police Department help protect property that they are
insuring. Frankly, we don't feel that the two percent is excessive.
Record at 10.
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existed with respect to the reasonableness of its classification.
The city had asserted that the fire and casualty companies re-
ceived special benefits from the police and fire services, that the
companies paid no property tax, that the high license tax on
them acted to equalize burden, and that the state legislature, in
Section 37-133 of the 1962 South Carolina Code, had treated fire
companies as a separate class and also established 2% of gross
premiums as a reasonable rate. The court discussed only the last
point: "Such officials relied, largely, upon Code Sec. 37-133..."
The court's failure to discuss the first two points is assumed to
mean that it rejected them as immaterial. The court rejected the
use of section 37-133 to "form a rational basis for charging these
particular taxpayers at a rate twenty times as much for a busi-
ness license as most other business enterprises pay.11 7 Referring
to Newberry I, the court stated:
As was pointed out..., in the absence of positive evidence to
the contrary, the license tax here imposed upon the plaintiff is
presumed to be reasonable and not to be interfered with by the
courts, unless its unreasonableness and oppressiveness are
clearly apparent, the burden of proving invalidity being upon
the plaintiff.118
In the present case, the court continued, while mindful that the
ordinance is presumed valid, the lower court had a "sound fac-
tual basis for concluding that the plaintiff had, at least prima
facie, met the burden of proving the tax palpably unreasona-
ble." 119 The court framed the issue: Had the city any rational
basis for the gross disparity of its rates?
It is conceded that the city had the right to classify for the
purpose of license taxes and considerable discretion as to the
rate to be imposed upon the respective classifications, but the
cardinal issue here is whether the city had any rational basis
for such a gross disparity and differentiation between the rate
charged property insurers, such as the plaintiff, and those
charged to the various other business and professional
licensees.120
117. 257 S.C. at 441, 186 S.E.2d at 242-43.
118. Id. at 438, 186 S.E.2d at 241.
119. Id. at 439, 186 S.E.2d at 241.
120. Id. The court cited an earlier decision interpreting the equal protection clause
in a license tax context:
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The following is quoted at some length because it states the es-
sential legal principles found by the court.
"The obvious purpose of the license ordinance is to impose
a tax, or license fee, upon the privilege of doing business in the
city during the current year. Implicit in that purpose is the re-
quirement that the tax be fair and nondiscriminatory."
In all of our decisions wherein a classification in a tax
statute or ordinance has been challenged as being in violation
of the equal protection clauses of the state and federal Con-
stitutions, this Court has recognized that a reasonable basis
for the different treatment was essential to the constitutional-
ity thereof. In Laurens v. Anderson,..., and Standard Oil Co.
v. City of Spartanburg,... , exemptions in license ordinances
were held constitutionally invalid for lack of a rational basis
therefor. In Wingfield v. South Carolina Tax Commission,...;
Cowart v. Greenville,..., and Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. City of
Spartanburg, .. ., classifications and differing tax rates were
upheld. The Court, in each of these, recognized the essentiality
of a rational basis for the classification and differentiation in
tax rates and pointed to the facts which constituted such
bases.
1 21
Rather than simply affirm the decision in favor of the taxpayer,
the court remanded the case to permit the city to develop any
relevant factual issues, because it appeared that about seventy
other municipalities had comparable taxes on fire and casualty
companies. That, the court believed, made the "case one of
grave public importance.
' '122
Following the decision, the city lawyers met with USFG's
lawyers and took the position that they had developed all the
facts. Consequently, they were agreeable to a settlement of the
"[C]lassification must not be arbitrary-that is, 'must always rest upon some
difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to
which the classification is proposed-'."
Compliance with the equal protection clauses of the Constitutions requires
that any classification be not arbitrary and bear a reasonable relation to the
legislative purpose sought to be effected, and that all members of each class be
treated alike under similar circumstances.
Id. at 439-40, 186 S.E.2d at 241-42 (quoting City of Laurens v. Anderson, 75 S.C. 62, 55
S.E. 136 (1906)).
121. Id. at 440-41, 186 S.E.2d at 242 (quoting City of Columbia v. Niagara Fire Ins.
Co., 249 S.C. 388, 154 S.E.2d 674 (1967)) (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 442, 186 S.E.2d at 243.
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case on terms favorable to USFG. Other cases, in which USFG
was a part, were also settled on a favorable basis at that time.
For the license year 1972, USFG paid a tax under protest to
the city of Spartanburg. The challenge produced the decision in
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. City of Spartanburg
(Spartanburg /).123 The mayor of Spartanburg testified at trial
that the classification was justified because it equalized the
property tax and compensated for special services.12 The valid-
ity of the taxing ordinance was upheld and USFG appealed. The
supreme court made clear that it intended no change in the law:
"The law in this field has been recently reviewed and expounded
in... [Newberry I and Newberry II] and will not be repeated
here. '125 The question was one of fact and the state of the
record.
USFG, at the time of the mayor's deposition, believed that
the justifications had been rejected by the supreme court and
referred to them as "frivolous. 1 2'  The court, however, stated:
123. 263 S.C. 169, 209 S.E.2d 36 (1974).
124. His example was Southern Bell:
Q. Now, earlier I asked you if there were any other categories than Casu-
alty and Fire Companies which paid as much as two per cent except, of course,
for Duke Power Company, and I believe your answer was no; why would
a-what fact that you know of distinguishes for the purpose of license taxation
a fire insurance company from any other type of business?
A. Well, to begin with, very few of them pay property taxes and when you
start to set up your business license fees for the support of the city budget
there are two or three factors that you consider and one of them is whether or
not the company pays city license fees; secondly, whether or not the city's ser-
vices directly benefit that particular company more than-those types of com-
panies more than others. Of course, here you get practically no real estate or
personal property taxes, whereas if you take a company like Southern Bell you
get some two hundred thousand dollars a year, I believe, in taxes alone plus
the license fee.
Q. Now, excuse me, may I interrupt to ask a question about Southern Bell.
With respect to the two hundred thousand dollars that you get there, what is
that based on?
A. That's based on the real estate and personal property; they don't have
so much real estate but they have considerable personal inventory.
Q. And so this has been taken into account, the fact that Southern Bell
pays an ad valorem tax of some two hundred thousand dollars per year in
arriving at its license rate?
A. Yes.
Record at 30-31.
125. 263 S.C. at 172, 209 S.E.2d at 37.
126. Brief of Appellant at 9.
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The experienced and knowledgeable mayor of Spartanburg tes-
tified that city council had from time to time reviewed the or-
dinance in an effort to arrive at fair rates of taxation. In coun-
cil's opinion the rate under attack is not unreasonable for two
principal reasons.... Fire and casualty insurers receive more
benefit than other businesses from two of the City's most ex-
pensive and efficient services, fire and police protection ...
Such insurers pay little, if any, ad valorem tax and, inferen-
tially, contribute substantially to the cost of city government
only by the business license tax.2 7
The court accepted the special services justification, stating that
the existence of police and fire departments and their "un-
doubted relevance to the fire and casualty insurance business
were simply considered by council in fixing the license tax
rate."
1 28
The court also accepted the property tax justification:
Appellant insists that to relate the higher license tax to
the fact that businesses of this class are not substantially sub-
ject to the City's ad valorem tax amounts to a penalty for not
owning property in Spartanburg, which the City has no right to
impose. But it seems reasonable that fire and casualty insurers,
who annually collect millions of dollars in premiums from the
inhabitants of a city, should make more than a minimal contri-
bution to the government of the city. The case for the validity
of the license tax is that the rate was fixed in the exercise of
council's judgment as to a fair rate or business license tax on
fire and casualty insurers. Arguably, an intelligent judgment
required consideration of the fact that these businesses were
substantially unaffected by the City's principal source of reve-
nue, the ad valorem tax, which bore heavily on some other
licensees.12 9
Although the court did not cite the 1873 Hayne decision,
which held that it is inherent in the nature of a license tax that
it act in aid of the property tax,130 the court reached the same
conclusion. Further, the court found that USFG had not met its
burden:
127. 263 s.c. at 172-73, 209 S.E.2d at 37.
128. Id. at 174, 209 S.E.2d at 38.
129. Id.
130. State v. Hayne, 4 S.C. 403 (1873). See notes 19-29 and accompanying text
supra.
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The license tax here imposed upon the appellant is pre-
sumed to be reasonable, and the burden of proving otherwise is
upon it. Appellant asks us to hold that this burden has been
met because the ordinance taxes it eight times more than it
taxes the majority of other businesses, and twice as much as
the next highest business, and because it has shown that no
reason exists which can justify this inequality of treatment. On
this record, we are not convinced that the bases advanced by
the City for assessing a higher rate of business license tax
against appellant are irrational, or that the resulting rate is so
palpably unreasonable as to justify our interference. 31
The same parties were before the court again in United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. City of Spartanburg (Spar-
tanburg II).132 USFG had paid the license tax in 1973, 1974, and
1975 under protest. The city moved for summary judgment as-
serting that no genuine issue of fact existed and that the legal
issue had been decided against plaintiff in Spartanburg I. The
circuit judge denied the motion and ruled that USFG was "enti-
tled to develop any factual issues which may be different from
the issues concluded by the judgment in the 1971 and 1972
cases. ' 133 The city appealed to the supreme court, which dis-
missed the appeal on the grounds that an order denying sum-
mary judgment is an interlocutory decision and not directly
appealable.
The actions were then referred to a master in equity. USFG
argued that the city had no rational basis for the disparity of
rates. It presented evidence that the city's protective services
contributed to lowering premium charges to customers, resulting
in reduced company profits, which are a ratio of the premium
rate. After this evidence was presented, the city abandoned the
justification of special benefits.
The second issue, property tax equalization, was more diffi-
cult. USFG had paid no property tax. If it is a correct legal prin-
ciple that a license tax should act in aid of a property tax, then
some equalization was required. USFG did not dispute this legal
principle, but did argue that the result of the license tax was not
equalization, but inequity.
131. 263 S.C. at 175, 209 S.E.2d at 38.
132. 267 s.c. 210, 227 S.E.2d 188 (1976).
133. Id. at 211, 227 S.E.2d at 189.
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When the property tax was added to the license tax of four-
teen specified businesses, three utilities franchised by the city
paid licensee taxes and ad valorem taxes in sums greater than
USFG's tax payment, as a ratio of gross receipts. One paid .56 %
of gross revenues in municipal taxes; another paid .51%; and the
remainder paid less than .50%. Because USFG paid over 2%, a
disparity existed.
In addition to the comparison with specific businesses,
USFG presented some overall figures. All property tax which
was paid was attributed to nonfire and casualty licensees (an at-
tribution, of course, that is contrary to fact), and the license tax
payments were added to that to show that $4,006,811 was paid
in taxes on gross receipts of $452,883,554 for a ratio to gross re-
ceipts of 0.885%. The same figure for the fire and casualty com-
panies was 2.097%. In license tax alone nonfire and casualty
companies had a ratio to gross receipts of 0.176%. The inclusion
of the property taxes-in the unrefined way apparently neces-
sarylS4 -sharply reduced the disparity against the fire and casu-
alty companies, from over 10 to 1 to about 2.5 to 1.
The master in equity found for the city, the circuit judge
affirmed, and the supreme court affirmed pursuant to Rule 23."5
The meaning of the court's Rule 23 decision may be that a dis-
parity of that dimension is not sufficient to incite inquiry.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent amendments to the constitution have removed the
two specific references to license taxes.138 There is no indication,
however, that the recent amendments were intended to alter the
judicial development of the theory of license taxes over the last
century.
134. In a subsequent case, now before the circuit court, United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Beaufort, the figures were limited to the property taxes paid only by licen-
sees. All taxes and fees paid by all licensees showed a payment of $270,491 on gross
income of $47,813,555, a ratio of less than 0.6%, "less than one-third (Ia) of the license
tax levy on fire and casualty." Brief of United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. at 24.
135. S.C. Sup. Ct. R. 23.
136. The reference in S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 6 (1962) was removed in 1973. 1973
S.C. Acts 67, No. 63. The reference in S.C. CONsT. art. X, § 1 (1976) was removed in
1977. 1977 S.C. Acts 90, No. 71.
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